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The economics of information have
been established by now as anintegral
part of economic analysis. The effect ofthe scarcity o information
on the dispersion of prices andwages, the quality of goods,
frictional unemployment and themicroeconomics of inflation have been
widely discussed in the literature.1
However, surprisingly little has
been written on the implications of
search (and in particular, job
search) for the estimation of thewage function and its
ramifications in such cases as theestimation of the determinants of
labor force participation,
age-earning profiles, rates of return and
rates of depreciation of humancapita]., degree of discrimation, etc.2
Given a wage offer distribution,the parameters of the observed
wage distribution depend on the intensity ofsearch. The lower a
person's wage demands the greater the chanceof his finding an
acceptable job, but the lower the wage heexpects to receive and the
wider the dispersion of acceptablewages around their mean. On the
other hand, the job seekermay opt for a more ambitious search
strategy, raising his minimum wage demand and
consequently increasing
the risk of remaining
unemployed, but also increasing the expected-2-
wage and decreasing the dispersion of the acceptable offers.
Much of the discussion in labor economics concerning labor force
participation, wages, and earnings centers on the wage offer
distribution. However, the empirical validation of the theory is based
on the observed wage distribution. The implicit identification of wage
offers with observed wages is particularly suspect when those employed
constitute only a fraction of the total population. In this case, the
observed distribution represents only one part of the wage offer
distribution, the other part being rejected by the job seekers as
unacceptable. Thus, the traditional estimation procedures may involve
certain biases when applied to the secondary labor groups-- married
women, teenagers, and the aged.
This paper attempts to point out some of these biases and suggests
a method for their correction. In the next section we outline a
simplified search model. The implicationsof this model for the
investigation of labor force participation, discrimination, and the
rates of return and rates of depreciation of hunan capital are discussed
in the third section. In the fourth section I describe an estimation
procedure for the wage_offer distribution using a simplified set of
assumptions. The paper closes with a discussion of some results
obtained using the new method.
Correcting for what I call the selectivity bias I show that
traditional measures underestimate the rate of return to human capital
and its rate of depreciation when they are applied to married women.
These measures tend to overstate the white/non-white wage
differential, but to understate the wage offer differentials between-3-
males and females and betweenwomen with and without young children.
The use of data on theaverage wage of working women yields upward
biased estimates of the effect ofwages on the labor force participation
of married women, as wellas overestimates (in absolute terms) of the
age and education effects.
The Search Model
Economic literature contains alarge variety of search models. These
models vary in their description ofthe search behavior and their
assumptions about the job seeker's time horizonand his prior
knowledge of market conditions. Someauthors assume that the job
seeker decides ahead of timeon the number of searches he will
undertake while others adopt asequential search model. Some assume
that the wage-offer distributionis well known, while otherspostulate
that the job seeker revises hisassumptions about the distribution
as a consequence of the search. Someallow for an infinite time
horizon while others restrict thetime horizon.
For simplicity let us assume thatthe job seeker is unemployed,
that he adopts a sequential searchstrategy, that he has perfect
knowledge on the job-offer distribution(but that he does not know
what is the wage associated with
any specific vacancy), that he has
an infinite time horizon, and thatjob-hopping is prohibitively
expensive.3 The job seekeris faced by a stream of job offers.Let
it be assumed, for simplicity,that these offers arrive ata uniform
rate, and let us define the time interval
in such a way that the job
seeker samples one offerper period. Firms differ in their search
costs (e.g. the cost ofascertaining the worker's marginal productivity)-4-
and consequently may offer differentwages W to the same job seeker,
where W consists of non-pecuniaryas well as pecuniary returns. Let
f(W) denote the density function of W.
The job hunter decides on awage W to distinguish between those
wage offers which he deems acceptable and those which herejects. The
search process ends as soon as the job seekerreceives an offer that
exceeds W. Let W0 denote the job seeker'sprice of time at home; then
he accepts no wage offer that falls shortof W0, i.e. W'W0. In
general, the job seeker determines W so thatany acceptable job offer
will assure him of an income stream notinferior to the one he expects
if he continues his search. LetR denote the present value of a one
dollar wage offer accepted in Deriodn
-t -n R (l+r) =(l+r) /r,
t=n+l
where it is assumed that the rate of discountr is constant. Let
I be the present value of the incomestream the job seeker expects
to receive if he continues his searchbeyond period n (both R and
are discounted to period 0); then R W >I,i.e.W >I/R nfl- n n- n n
Assuming decisions are made at the end of theperiod [i.e. offers
accepted in period n start yielding returnsonly in period (n +1)],
the job seeker enjoys in period nan income of W0 -C,where C denotes
the costs of search which include both directcosts (e.g. advertisement,
employment-agency fees, transportation) and indirectones (e.g. the
value of leisure forgone owing to thesearch).
Given the wage offer distribution f(W) andthe asking wage W*,there-5-
exists a probability of that the job seeker will accept a job in
period n, where
P =Prob(WW) =ff(W)dW. (2) n n n
n
An acceptable job will yield on the average awage of E, where
E =E(W1W> W*)=_1 Wf(W)dW. (3)
nn n- n Pw
n
If the offer received in period n is found to beunacceptable [an event
whose assigned probability is - the job seeker can still look
forward to an expected income stream ofI. A job seeker embarking on
search in period n can, therefore, expect an income stream of
'n-i =(1+r)(W0-C)+PRE+(1-P)I, (4)
where r is the rate of discount. Given the infinite timehorizon, the
constant rate of discount, constant costs of search (C), constantcurrent
earnings (WO) and a constant wage-offer distribution [f(W)], the job
seeker in period n +1is faced by the same conditions facing the job
seeker in period n. Hence, the same optimumstrategy that was employed
in period n will be adopted in period (n +1),i.e. W =W÷
=
Consequently,the present value of the returns to search in periodn
(discounted to period n) should equal the present value of the returns




Moreover,the probability ofacceptance (P) and the averageacceptable
wage (E) remain constant over time.
Inserting equations (5) and (1) inequation (4) andgiventhat
=W,P P, and E =Efor every n, theasking wage equals5
{r(W0 -C)+PE].
(6)
In other words, the minimum
acceptable wage will be such as toequate
thecost of search plus forgoneearnings with the net returns from
search
E - C+(J*W0) =P—_---.
(7)
The lower boundary of WisW0.Letp0 be the probability that
thewage offer exceeds W0 and E0, the
average acceptable wage when the
job seeker's wage demands areconfined to WO. The job seekerquits
his search when W0 >I/R ,i.e.when nfl
E0 wO
(8) r
For example, in the case ofmarried women, when theirprice of time in
home activities issufficiently high relative to theirmarket
productivity (i.e. if W0 >E0-rC/P°),the woman will decide tostay
out of the labor force altogether.
Other things being equal,an increase in the job seeker'sprice
of time (W0) reduces theforgone earnings associated withthe rejection
of any wage offer (W*-W0)and thus increases thejob seeker's wage
demands, though at a lower rate thanthe increase in the price oftime-7-
dW* =r dW0 ￿dW0. (9)
The increase in wage demands reduces the probability ofemployment
dP =.f(W*)dW*=-rf(W*)dwO <0, (10)
but increases the average acceptable wage
dE =f(W*)(E -W*)dW*=r
r f(W*)(E -W*)dWO>0, (11)
Moreover, since the returns to entry into the labor force [i.e.
P0(E0 -W0)/r]are a diminishing function of W0, and since the cost of
search (C) may increase with W°, this change increases thetendency to
abstain from entering the labor market.
Given W0, an upward shift in the wage offer distribution, i.e.
an increase in the mean wage offer distribution [other parameters
of f(W) remaining constant], increases the returns to search and hence
the probability of labor force participation andwage demands. However,
the adjustment in wage demands lags behind the shift inf(W)
dW* =r dTiw (12)







The increase in the wage demands intensifies the effect of theshift of
f(W) on the expected acceptable wage offer. Theaverage acceptable








When the shift in the wage-offer distribution
is accompanied by an
increase in the price of time thetendency to enter the labor force
increases as long asdl.!w >dW0.Both the shift in f(W) and the increase
in W0, tend to increasewage demands. Assuming dW0 <
dJ.lw,wage demands
increase at a slower rate than the shift inMw(dW* <d1iq),resulting in
both an increase in the probability ofemployment and an increase in the
average acceptable wage (the latter however changingmore slowly than
The Wage Offer Distributionversus The Observed Wage Distribution:
The Selectivity Bias
The model described in the previous sectionanalyzes the job seeker's
search strategy. One can design a somewhat similarmodel to describe
the employer's search policy. Thereare still some unresolved
problems: how do the two strategies interact and what is theprocess
that determines simultaneously the rate ofunemployment, the vacancy
rate, and the distribution of wages. The formulation of sucha model
is clearly beyond the scope of thispaper. At the risk of being
unrigorous I shall therefore adopt a partial-equilibriumapproach. I
assume that the wage-offer distribution is given and isnot affected by
the job seeker's strategy.6 Under thisstrong assumption, the observed
wage distribution is a subset of the wage-offer distribution, i.e. that
part of the distribution which is acceptable to the job seeker.
Wage data constitute a prime source of information forthe estimation-9-
of labor supply and demand, the determinants and the effects of the
investment in human capital (e.g. schooling, on-the-jobtraining,
health, migration) and the analysis of occupational choice. Objections
have been raised to the indiscriminate use of such data whichusually
reflect only the average pecuniary returns to a person's labor before
the deduction of taxes. hence they do not allow a distinction between
the marginal wage and the average wage, do not account fornon-pecuniary
returns (i.e. psychic income) and the value of on-the-job training, and
are overstated to the extent that work involves direct costs (e.g.
commuting) and that the supply of labor is affected by after-taxwages.
Several ingenious methods haVe been devised to overcome these
shortcomings.
One bias that seems to have escaped economists' attention is
that introduced by the search process. Given the wage-offer
distribution, the bolder a person's search strategy (i.e. the higher
one's asking wage W*) the higher the wage heexpects to accept. Thus, the
observed wage distribution has to be adjusted for differences in the
search policy.
Nowhere is this bias more serious than in the case of thesecondary
labor-force groups. These groups are characterized bypartial
participation in the labor force, indicating that portions of thewage
offer distribution faced by thesegroups are considered too low to be
acceptable. The observed wage distribution is a truncated section of
the wage-offer distribution and its parameters dependon the parameters
of f(W) as well as on the truncation point W. Unless variations inW
are corrected for one is bound to obtain biased estimates of the- 10-
parametersof f(W).
Let us consider two groups of women who face thesame wage-offer
distribution, f(W), have the same costs of search,C, and the same
discount rate. Let it also be assumed that bothgroups have the same
price-of-time distribution except that the mean price of time(IIWO) of
one group is higher than that of the second [let these distributions be
denotedby g(W0 -K),where K1 >K2>0and dPo =dKJ.Since both
groups face the same opportunities f(W) and have the same costs of
search, theyhave the same critical price of time, i.e. the price that
distinguishesbetween women who participate and those who do not
participatein the labor force [i0 =- (rC/P0)].Their labor force
participation rate 0 equals
0 =Prob(W0< = JWOg(wO-K)dW0 . (15)
This rate is inversely related to the mean price of time (and to K)
do=_(W°)d0. (16)
Given the wage-offer distribution, the price of time w9 determines
the asking wage W, which in turn determines theaverage acceptable wage
E1. Given a sufficiently long period of search (a large enough n), the
average wage of the labor force participants in a certain group equals
FE(EIW° <W0) = fWEg(wO-K)dW0. (17)
Itcan be shown that when g(W0) is log-convex (a property which— 11—
holdsfor most functions which we have in mind) a leftward shift in the
price-of-time distribution (i.e. a decline in K) results in a reduction
of the wage demands and the average wage,7 d/dPwo >0.
For example, let us assume two groups of marriedwomen, say whites
and non-whites, with the same market characteristics (e.g. education
and work experience), If there were no discrimination, andignoring
differences in psychic incomes, both groups should face thesame wage
offer distribution f(W) (Figure 1).But, if an average white woman
places on her time at home a higher value (W0)' than anaverage non-
white because of her husband's higher earnings and the existence of
other sources of income, her wage demands (W*) will be higher, and
her realized average wage CE) will be higher, though theprobability
that she participates in the labor forcemay be lower. A comparison
of the average wages of working women belonging to the twogroups
and may lead to the conclusion that non-white women are
discriminated against, while in effect discrimination isnon-
existent.
On the other hand, if the two groups have the sameprice-of-
time distribution, the same C and r, and the same wage-offer
distribution except for a shift factor, then by (11) and(14) the
difference in the critical price of time (W0) between the twogroups
is equal to the difference between their meanwage offers. We shall
expect the group with the higher mean wage offer to have the higher
• participation rate [d0/dp =dO/dW0=g(W0)>0].The increase in the
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Figure 1
EN Ew Wage offers- 13-
Thus,if it is assumed that education affects marketproductivity
(and hence the wage-offer distribution) but does not affect non-market
productivity and the price of time, women with higher education are
expected to have a higher participation rate. Theaverage wage of these
women however increases more slowly than their meanwage offers. These
conclusions will hold even if we remove theassumption that education
does not affect non-niarket productivity as longas it is assumed that
its effect on market productivity exceeds that ofnon-market productivity
(see Figure 2).
wage comparisons of whites and non-whites and of women with
different levels of education are two of thecases that may be affected
by what may be called the "selectivity bias." In theremaining part of
this section I shall discussafew othercases where this kind of bias
may be prevalent.
I'lale-female wage differentials: Over 95percent of males in the prime
age groups (25-55) participate in the labor force (U.S. Statistical
Abstract. 1971, p. 21), while the rate ofparticipation of females, and
in particular married women, almost never exceeds55 percent (ibid., p. 24).
The difference in participation can beexplained by the lower wage-offer
distribution facing women, and probably by theirhigher value of time in
the absence of market opportunities. Both factorstend to increase the
difference between the average acceptablewage and the mean wage offer.
It has been estimated (Fuchs, 1971) that femaleaverage hourly
earnings adjusted for color, schooling, age, city size, maritalstatus,
class of worker, and length of work-trip constitutedin 1959 only two









bias"it seems that this figure underestimates the "true" male-femalewage
differentials.
Age-wage profiles: Labor force participation rates of malesvary
very little in the 25-54 age-groups, decline somewhat (to a level of
about 80 percent) in the 55-64group and fall very steeply (to 25
percent) thereafter. Female participation rates have a bimodal
distribution with peaks in the 20-24 and 45-54age groups (iJ.
Statistical Abstract 1971, p. 24). These variations in the
participation rates may bias the estimates of the age-wage profiles.
Age-wage profiles (or age-earning profiles) are used frequently to
estimate the rate of depreciation of human capital (Rosen,1972) and the
rates of return to education and on-the-job training. Retirementmay
introduce a bias in the estimate of the rate of depreciation and
obsolescence of human capital. The direction of the bias is however
indeterminate.it depends on who is the first to retire, those with the
high wage offers or those with the low wage offers. The increase in
non-human capital with age may increase the shadowprice of time, which
will rise more for those who benefited over time from thehigher wage
offers, so that they will be the first to retire. On the otherhand,
the margin between the market wage and the homewage is smallest for
those at the lower tail of the wage distribution.Any deterjorjatjonin
wage offers may therefore make them leave the labor force.
Likewise, as argued above, inter-educational variations in the
participation rates may bias the estimated rate of return on
investment in human capital of women. It is well establishedthat
women's labor force participation increases with education.Put-16-
differently, an increase in education shifts the wage-offer distribution
by more than it increases the woman's price of time at home(the latter
increases either because of the effect educationmay have on her home
productivity and/or because of the increased, probability that she is
married to a man with higher earnings).Ignoring the effect education
may have on the dispersion of the wage-offer distribution, the
difference between the observed averagewage rate (E) and the mean
wage-offer distribution shrinks with education.8 The difference between
the observed wages of working women in two educationgroups therefore
tends to understate the difference between theirmean wage offers and
the estimated rate of return to education.
It has been argued (Michael and Lazear, 1971) that thewoman's wage
rate may be affected by the number andage composition of her children.
The existence of young children increases the demand for thewife's time
at home and her price of time and reduces hertendency to participate
in the labor force. Leaving the labor marketmay accelerate the
depreciation of the woman's market-oriented skills and shift herwage-
offer distribution downward. However, the decline in thewage-offer
distribution does not necessarily result in a decline in the observed
wage of working mothers. If the increase in these women's wage demands
is sufficiently large it will offset the decline in thewage offers
and result in an increase in the observedaverage wage.9
The determinants of ].abor force participation: Labor force
participation increases with the mean of the wage-offer distribution
and declines with W0. A prerequisite for the estimation ofthe
determinants of participation is knowledge of the distribution ofthe- 17-
priceof time at home (Ben-Porath, 1973; Gronau, 1973b; Lewis, 1971).
However, this information is insufficient unless supplemented by
knowledge of the mean wage offer. Replacing the latter by the average
observed wage yields only imperfect estimates of the parameters of the
labor force participation function, unless dne knows the relationship
between the average wage and the mean wage offer (dE/dpw).
It was shown that an increase in the mean wage offer leads to
an increase in the observed wage (E), but that this increase is smaller
than the original shift inp. Differences ii% the observed wages of
different, say, education groups therefore tend to understate the
difference between the mean wage offers and to overstate the
sensitivity of participation rates of changes in wages. Furthermore,
since the correlation between and E is not perfect, the
misspecification of the wage variable introduces errors of measurement
into the equation which may also bias the other estimates of the
determinants of labor force participation.
The Estimation of the Wage Offer Distribution
The observed wage distribution is only one section of the wage-offer
distribution, namely those wages that exceed the asking wage W* where
the price of time of the job seeker falls short of W0. To prevent the
kind of selectivity bias discussed in the preceding section the original
wage-offer distribution must be generated. The derivation of the wage-
offer distribution from the truncated observed distribution is a
difficult task even if the point of truncation (i.e. W*) is known, and it
verges on the impossible when W* and its determinants, i.e. the price of
time, the costs of search, and the rate of discount are not known. In the- 18-
followingsection I adopt an oversimplified version of the search model.
Thissectionis therefore merely illustrative, serving, it is hoped, as
a base point for future research.
Let it be assumed that the job seeker is aware of the best offer
he can attain10 W and let his policy be to stay out the labor force if
his price of time W0 exceeds his best offer W and otherwise toaccept the
wage offer W. Given these oversimplified assumptions the participation
rate is
U =Prob(W>W0)=Prob(w=W-> 0)= g(w)dw, (18)
where g(w) is the density function of the differential w =W-W0.The
average wage of working women is
E =E(WW>W0)=- !fWh(W,W°)dWdw°, (19) e-
where h(W,W°) denotes the joint density distribution of W and W°.
Let it be assumed that h(W,W0) is a bivariatenormal density
function




- andp is the correlation
coefficient between W and W0. The differential w has a normal










+ X(a/a)jl - , (22)
whereis the regression coefficient of W0 on W(=pao/a) and
X =g(Z=-p/a)/6 (23)
Let it be assumed that the (best) wage offers depend on the
woman's race, age, education, and number of children but not on her
husband's income.
12
The sample can be classified by race, age,
education, number of children, and husband's income. Given the rate
of participation 0 in each cell, the value of the ratio -(si/a), i.e.
the value satisfying Prob(Z > -p/a) =O,canbe generated from the normal
tables.'3 Given the value of-(p/a) onecanuse the same tables to
derivethe value of g(Z =-p/a),and hence the value of X.
Assuming that ao does not change with income, one can regress within a




where a0. =est(P.)anda =estil-1(a/a).
Moreover if one adopts
the stronger assumption that a does not vary with race,age, education
and number of children (i.e. that a is constant) one can estimate for
the whole sample
E =Ea.D. + ajX , (25)
Oj j- 20-
whereU. is a dummy variable representing race/age/education/nber_of_
children group j,andwhere a0. =est(llw.).
TheData and the Results
To estimate the wage-offer distribution I used the 1960 Census 1/1000
sample.I focused on married women, the sample consisting of 26,530
women belonging to urban primary families, spouse present. Assuming that
the mean of the wage-offer distribution is a function ofrace, age,
education, and number of children, the data were subclassified by these
characteristics: 2 race groups (white, negro) x 4 agegroups (below
30, 30-39, 40-49, 50+) x 4 education groups (elementary school, high
school, college, and graduate studies)x 3 groups for number of children
below the age of 6 (0,1,2+). Since it was assumed that the wife's
price of time in the absence of market opportunities is, in addition to
these factors, a function of income, the data were further divided by
income excluding wife's earnings (12 groups: less than $2,000, 2,000-
2,999, 3,000-3,999,...,9,000-g,999, 10,000-14,999, 15,000-19,999, and
20,000-f).14 This subclassification yielded 1,152 cells whichare the
basic observations of my sample.
For each cell I computed two statistics: (a) the labor force
participation rate of women belonging to the cell (i.e. the percentage
of women working or looking for work during the week preceding the
census), and (b) the average hourly wage rate of working women
belonging to the cell. The 1960 census did not contain any direct
evidence on the hourly wage rate and I had to do with an imperfect
substitute, defining the hourly wage as the ratio of the woman's 1959
earnings divided by the product of the number of weeks she worked in- 21-
1959and the number of hours she worked during the week preceding the
census. Finally, to rule out the possibility of negative mean wage
offers, the assumption of bivariate normality was replaced by the
assumption of bivariate log-normality. Thus, instead of computing the
usual arithmetic mean wage rate I computed the arithmetic mean of the
natural logarithm of the wage rates. The dependent variable E in
equation (25) therefore denotes the natural logarithm of the geometric
mean of the hourly wage rates.
Equation (25) was estimated for 4 groups: whites with no children
under 6 years old, whites with one child under 6, whites with twoor
more children under 6 and non-whites with no children under 6 (the other
two groups are too small to allow estimation). The results are presented
in Table i.15 All the regressions are significant and all the
coefficients of X are positive as expected (they are significant in
three out of the four cases, the exception being the regression for
non-whites).
Given the estimates ofa0 one can compute the median of the log-
normal best-wage-offer distribution =
exp(a03)].
These estimates
are presented in Table 2 and Figure 3 for the group of white women with
no young children, together with the original data of the geometric
means of the hourly wage rates.
Figure 3 demonstrates two of the salient features of theage-wage
profiles of married women. The first of these, often discussed in the
literature, is their flatness. Thus, except for thewages of women
graduates, there is very little change in the averagewage of working
married women over their life cycle.16 The second feature,one rarelyTABLE 1
















































































No observations in the cell.- 23-
TABLE2
The Geometric Average Wage And the Median Wage Offerby Age




<30 1.12 1.45 1.93 2.35
30-39 1.37 1.53 1.90 3.02
40-49 1.37 1.54 2.11 2.59
50+ 1.39 1.56 2.17 3.20
Median wage offer
<30 0.81 1.14 1.64 2.17
30-39 1.02 1.16 1.43 2.54
40-49 0.96 1.13 1.60 2.24
50+ 0.82 1.02 1.49 2.47Figure 3
The Geometric Average Wageand the Median Wage Offerby Age and Education
White Married Women withNo Young Children
Age
Or r'i(U ate












commentedon, is the fact that the profiles show no tendency to slope
17 downward as a result of negative net investmentin human capital.
The replacement of the averagewage of working women by the imputed
median wage offers has very little effecton the slope of the early
parts of the age profiles, but reverses the slope of the latersegment
(the exception again being the graduate group). Itseems that a
married woman faces her peak wage offer at theage of 30-40 when she has
elementary or high school education, and at theage of 40-50 when she
is a graduate.18
Sixteen observations are too small asample to derive any strong
conclusions. Still, at the risk of seeming foolhardy,i could not
resist the temptation to apply to the observationsin Table 2 some of
the techniques devised and applied with suchsuccess by Jacob Mincer
(1972) to earnings of prime-age males. Assuming thatschooling and
on-the-job training involve no direct costs, and that theratio of
"time-equivalent" investment in on-the-job training declineslinearly
with age (Mincer, 1972, Ch. 3) I estimated thefunction
E =b0+b1S+b2T+b3T2,
'(26)
where S denotes the number ofyears of schooling (it was assumed that
these are 8, 12, 15 and 18 for the four education
groups, respectively),
and T denotes the number ofyears of working experience (defined19 as
T =age
-S - 8).To correct for heteroscedasticity each of the
observations was weighted by the number ofworking women belonging to
that age-education group.2° The results ofequation (26) are compared
with the estimates of a similarregression equation in which the- 26-
estimatedmedian wage offer is the dependent variable(see Table 3).
The strong multico].linearity between the variableT and its
square (the simple correlation coefficient is 0.97) undermines the
reliability of the estimated effect of market experience.21Keeping the
shakiness of the evidence in mind, it is stilliDteresting to compare
the coefficients of T and T2. Thus, while thecoefficients of both I
and T2 in the regression of theaverage wage rate are positive, implying
an upward sloping age-wage profile, the coefficient of 12 isnegative
when the dependent variable is the imputedwage offers, as one would
expect. The wage offers increase at an ever diminishing rate,
reflecting the decline in investment in human capital over the life
cycle. An absolute decline in wage offers sets in after 25-30years of
experience (-b2/b3 =27).
Assuming that education has the same effect on the productivity of
time in all its uses- (e.g. work in the market, work athome, education
and leisure) the coefficient ofyears of schooling in equation (26)
measures the rate of return to formal education (Mince; 1972, Ch.
3).
The comparison of the coefficient of S in theregression of the wage
rate with that of the mean wage offer confirms our priorexpectations.
The use of the observed wage rather than theimputed wage offer tends
to bias downward the estimated rate of return to schooling. Theextent
of the bias increases when the experience variables(T and 12) are
omitted from the regression.
The data on the average wage rates in the other threegroups (white
women with young children and non-whites with noyoung children) ,and
consequently the other three regressions ,show no clear systematicpattern- 27-
TABLE3
The Estimation of the Rate of Return to Education and
the Effect of Work Experience*
Dependent Intercept Explanatory variable Adjusted
variable S T T2 R2
Average wage rate (E)
Regression (1): b -0.3901 0.0655 0.3048 0.2256 0.80
t 2.97 7.72 0.42 0.13
Regression (2): b -0.2273 0.0584 0.76
t 2.26 7.01
Median wage offer (j)
Regression(1): b -0.7429 0.0748 0.4356 0.1587 0.83
t 4.79 7.46 0.51 0.80
Regression (2): b -0.7986 0.0797 0.84
t 7.35 8.86
*Tis measured in 100-year units.- 28-
ofbehavior, and I have not attempted to apply equation (26) to these
22
groups,but have made do with a comparison of theaverage wage and
wage offers of the women belonging to these groups. This comparison
is contained in Table 4.
The first line of Table 4 describes the (geometric)average wage
of working women belonging to the fourgroups investigated in our
study. There are only slight differences in averagewages between the
three groups of white women, regardless of the number ofyoung
children, and there exists a substantial gap between thewage enjoyed
by white women and that of non-whites, the latter being less than two
thirds of the former. As the second line of this table indicates,this
pattern is little affected by using as weights the total number of
women belonging to a cell rather than the number of the working women
belonging to the cell.
The average wage of each group naturally depends on itsage and
educational composition. To standardize for differences incomposition
one has to use a uniform weighting scheme. The weights used tocompute
the "standardized potential wage rate" (line 3) are the number of white
women without young children belonging to the age and educationgroup.
The isolation of the age and education effect onlyslightly reduces the
white non-white differential (from 0.61 to 0.65) butchanges the wage
hierarchy of the white women. Thus, while the unstandardized figures
give an edge to women without young children (thewage of women with
2 young children being 87 percent of thewage of women without young
children) this relationship is reversed when one accounts forage and
education differences between thegroups (the ratio becoming 1.07).- 29-
TABLE4
The Geometric Average Wage and the Median




Children under 6 0 children
0 2+ under6
1. Average wage of working woman
-
$ 1.59 1.53 1.46 1.00
Relative* 1.00 0.96 0.92 0.63
2. Average potential wage rate
$ 1.56 1.53 1.36 0.95
Relative* 1.00 0.98 0.87 0.61
3. Standardized potential wage rate
$ 1.56 1.81 1.67 1.02
Relative* 1.00 1.16 1.07 0.65
4.Standardized median wage offer
$ 1.09 1.08 0.72 0.93
Relative* 1.00 0.99 0.66 0.85
*Therelative wage is the wage of group i divided by the corresponding
wage of white women with no young children.- 30-
Thesefigures thus appear to contradict the hypothesis thatchildren
result in accelerated depreciation of the mother'smarket skills.23
The replacement of the averagewage by the standardized imputed
median wage offer (line 4) leads to significantchanges in the
observed wage pattern. The effect of childrenon the mother's wage
offers turns out to be a prominent feature of thewage structure. The
wage a white mother with two young children canexpect to get in the
market is only two thirds of that of a womanbelonging to the same
age-education group who does not haveyoung children.(On the other
hand, one young child does not seem to affect his mother'swage offers.)
Furthermore, the removal of the selectivity biasseems to remove over
one half of the white/non-white differential (non-whites'wage offers
being 85 percent of those of whites), calling formajor revisions in the
evaluation of the importance of discriminationas a factor affecting
the wage structure of non-white women.
On the other hand, it seems that the estimate of themale-female
differential must be revised upwards. The medianwage offer of
married women is only about 70 percent of the standardizedaverage wage.
Since the male labor-force participationrate is close to 100 percent,
the data on their wages is hardly affectedby the selectivity bias (X
being very close to zero). The comparison ofwage offers of males and
females would therefore show a substantiallylarger differential than
the 3:2 ratio quoted earlier in thispaper.
Finally, it has been argued (Lewis, 1971) that using theaverage
wage of working women rather than their mean wage offer results inan
upward bias in the estimated effect of wages on labor forceparticipation.-31-
I have elsewhere (Gronau, l973a) used the results presented in Table 2
to estimate the price-of-time distribution and the implicitparticipation
function of American married women. Employing probit analysis I examined
the effect of the woman's and her husband'sage and education, family
income, and the number and age composition of the children on her
price of time, i.e. her labor force participation (I allowed the
effect of children to differ according to their mother's education).
The results of this analysis are reproduced in Table 5, whereone
regression contains the (geometric) average wage rate of working women
as an explanatory variable, and the other regression uses our estimate
of
These results clearly confirm our expectations. The introduction
of the wage offers as an explanatory variable considerably reduces the
estimated wage effect. The misspecification of thewage variable also
affects the estimated effects of other variables, notably the wife's
age and education.24 We have seen earlier that the observed wage of
working women belonging to the 50+ age group considerably overstates
the wage offers faced by their non-working counterparts. The decline
in labor force participation witnessed in thatgroup is therefore
attributed to age, while essentially it is merely awage effect.
Likewise, changes in the observed wage tend to understate the changes
in the wage offers associated with an increase in education.Using the
average wage of working women tends to overplay the direct effect of
education on labor force participation.25
The data on the hourly wage rate used in our estimatesare far from






















ant -1.894 1.58 0.870 1.44
1 income** -0.850 3.91 9.5 -0.823 3.86 17.1
0 0.159 0.46 -1.8 -0.346 1.18 7.1
0 -0.870 3.24 9.7 -0.249 0.85 5.1
tion*
entary 0.081 0.19 -0.9 -0.072 0.18 1.5
lege -2.138 2.43 23.8 —1.135 1.82 23.3
id's age*** —0.296 2.60 3.3 -0.206 1.84 4.2
rid's education*
nentary 0.418 2.10 -4.6 0.410 2.08 -8.4
lege -0.126 0.58 1.4 -0.128 0.59 2.6
of children <3
nentary -0.861 1.31 9.6 -0.868 1.32 17.8
rischool -1.077 4.20 12.0 -1.071 4.20 22.0
lege -1.880 3.49 20.9 -2.012 3.71 41.4
r of children 3 -5
nentary 0.114 0.20 -1.3 0.106 0.18 -2.2
rischool -0.768 3.53 8.5 -0.783 3.61 16.1
lege -0.443 0.99 4.9 -0.536 1.19 11.0
r of children 6 -11
nentary -0.186 0.79 2L1 -0.215 0.92 4.4
ischool -0.382 2.71 4.3 -0.389 0.28 8.0
Lege -0.364 1.22 4.0 -0.390 1.32 8.0
r of children 12 -17
nentary 0.275 1.05 -3.1 0.235 0.88 -4.8
school -0.291 1.78 3.2 -0.256 1.58 5.3
lege 0.337 0.96 -3.8 0.369 1.06 —7.6
tial hourlywage Cs)8.982 3.35 4.866 3.29
(hood ratio test 169.0 165.0
s of freedom 21 21
ny variable. **$10,000. ***10years.
Source: R. Gronau, "The Effect of Children ott the Housewife's Value of Time,"
1 of Political Economy, 73(No. 2, part II, March/April 1973), S168 -S199.-33-
annual rather than weekly participation. Dataproblems are enhanced by
a set of admittedly very strong assumptions,notably the assumption of
homoscedasticity of the price of time and thewage-offer distribution.
Finally, the estimation model is based on a searchmodel that is
clearly sub-optimal. Thus one should regard theresults of this
section as no more than an empiricalexercise. One should strive to
overcome these shortcomings by using a better suitedbody of data, by
assuming a different joint distribution of W and W0that calls for
weaker assumptions, or by focusingon a different statistic (e.g. the
standard deviation of thewage of working women).26 Nevertheless, it
seems, at least to me, that the evidence collected hereis a strong
enough warning that comparisons ofwage data should take selectivity













where =P(ao/a)is the regression coefficient of W0 on W. Themean
value of c is zero and its variance is a2 =ao(1-p2).Define the
standardized variable A =€/a,and let
=( - p)/(]-)a
=(Xa-p)/v'a2-a)=A+BA,
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XaWIW>WO)=+ aE(XIX>A*) =+ X'a.
*Thisappendix is based on the extensive comments of Gregg H. Lewis.- 35-
SinceX and Yare normally distributed, c and Awhich are linear
combinations of X and Y are normally distributed.
Furthermore, by
definition X and c and, in turn, X and Aare orthogonal. Hence
h'(X,A) =(21r)_lexp[_.(X2 +A2)].
Thus







= (2O)exp(-B2)f exp[-4(l +B2)(X+
1




and A2/(l +B2)=(_j.i/a)2=Zit is found that




o =Prob(W> W0) =Prob(X< A')
E(xlxA*) == [(-
hence,in general
E =+ Jl-J(a/a).- 36-
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Footnotes
*
Thisstudy is part of the NBER's project on Economic and Social
Measurement funded by National Science Foundation. Thepaper has not
undergone the full critical review accorded the National Bureau's
studies.I am greatly indebted to Gregg H. Lewis and RobertT. Michael
for their extensive notes.I benefited from the suggestions of Gary
Becker, Stanley Diller, Victor Fuchs, James Hckman, ThomasJuster and
Esther Samuel. Finally, I would like to thankMargo Faier for her
devoted research assistance.
'The economics ofinformation date back to Stigler's seminal
papers (1961, 1962) in the early 1960's. The theory gained renewed
popularity in the early 1970's in the context of the microeconomic
analysis of the Phillips curve (Gronau 1971, McCall 1970, Morténsen1970,
Phelps 1970). For other applicatjonsand asurvey of the theory see
Nelson, 1970 and Rothschild, 1971.
2Oneofthe few exceptions is Lewis (1971).
3Thus, I rule out a searchstrategy that calls for the job seeker to
accept the first job offered, continue his search while on thejob,and
switch to a better job as soon as it becomesavailable. This kind of
strategy is inconsistent with voluntary unemployment.
Admittedly, this model, first proposed in the literatureby McCall
(1970) and Mortensen (1970), is based on somewhatsimplified assumptions.
The use of a more sophisticated approach would not have affected
our major conclusion that there is a positive correlation betweenthe
initial wage demands andtheaccepted wage.- 39-
4Fora more rigorous proof of this statement see McCall (1970) and
Mortensen(1970). This conclusion does not hold if the ob seeker's
time horizon is finite, if imperfections in the capital market result
in an increase in r as the search proceeds, if there areincreasing
costs of search, if current earnings (e.g. marginal utility ofleisure)
diminish, or if the job seeker changes his evaluation of f(W) as the
result of the search (see Gronau, 1971).










Rearranging terms, one obtains equation (6).
6Thus, I rule out thepossibility that the employer is aware of the
job seeker's search strategy and adapts his wage offer accordingly.





where =Prob(W0W0). The likelihood ratio of hK(W°) depends solely




since(0 /0 )isa constant which is independent of W0 (it depends on K2 K1
W0, K1 and K2). Thus hK(WO) has a monotone likelihood ratio if
g(W0 -K)has one, a necessary and sufficient condition for which is
that -log g is convex (Lehman 1959, p. 330).
Since E has been shown to be a nondecreasing function of W0, and if
hK(WO) has a monotone likelihood ratio in W0
=fEhK(WO)dWO
is a nondecreasing function of K (ibid.,p. 74).
8An increase in the standarddeviation of the wage-offer
distribution leads to an increase in wage demands
dW* =rp xdow >0 where X =(E-
Itseffect on the probility of acceptance andtheaverage acceptable wage





dE =-f(W*)(X* -r X)(E -
whereX =(W*-
9Byequations (11) and (14) the average acceptable wage increases if
r+P p i dW0 >[1 -rf(W*) E -w*Idliw.
10 . Notethat from this point on W denotes the bestwage offer and
f(W) denotes the best_wage-offer distribution rather than thewage-
offer distribution.- 41-
11Seeappendix.
l2 ignore thepossible correlation between the husbandts income and
the wife's wage offers which may arise because of thepositive
correlation in their natural ability.
'3Forexample if 0 =0.16=>-i/a = 1,0 =0.50>-p/d=0,
o =0.84>-u/a = -1.
14This classification isvery similar but not identical to the one
I used before (Gronau, 1973b).
15
Instead of equation (25) I estimated
15 —
X=a0+ a.D.
+a1X, (25') •j=l 33
where the basic group (i.e. the subscript 00) is thegroup of women
30-39 years old with high school education. To derive the estimators
of the mean wage offers[a0 in equation (25)] one has to compute
a -= a'+a'..These estimates are presented in Table 1. Oj 00 Oj
However, I have not recalculated the t coefficients. Thus, thet.
coefficients (j =1,...,l5) presented in Table 1 reflect the significance
of the differential between the meanwage offers of the j-th group and
the base group (i.e. they serve to test thehypotheses H0 : =
whilethe t coefficient for the basegroup measures how significantly
different is the mean wage offer of thisgroup from zero (i.e.
H. : p =0).
3 wO
flatness may be partly due to a cohort effect, and doesnot
necessarily imply that women entering the labor force now canexpect no
increase in their wage rates.-42-
170fcourse, this may be merely due to the crude aggregation of
the wage data. The expected downward sloping portion of theage-wage
profilemjghthave emerged had I used a more refined age classification.
However, it is noteworthy that Arleen Leibowitz, who fitted a quadratic
function to data of weekly wages of married women whoare full time
workers, found that the wage rates tend to decrease only after 43
years of experience when the woman is a high school graduate, and after
60 years of experience when she has 13years of schooling or more
(Leibowitz 1972, p. 43). This would imply that the peak of theage-wage
profile is reached at the age of 61 if the woman is a high school
graduate and at the age of 83 if she finished college (theregression
coefficients in the case of elementary school are insignificant).
18The negativelysloping portion of the wage-offer profiles may, of
course, be due purely to inter-cohort differences.
19Age is assumed to be 26,35, 45 and 55 in the four age groups,
respectively.
20The major conclusions ofthis analysis would not have changed had
I used a different weighting scheme,e.g. estimating an unweighted
regression or weighting each observation by the total number ofwomen
belonging to that group.
210ne shouldnot conclude from the low t-values associated with T
and T2that length of work experience does not playany role in the
determination of wage rates of married women. The omission of T2from
equation (26) results in the coefficient of T becomingsignificantly
different from zero (see also Leibowitz 1972,p. 43).- 43-
22Anyattempt of this kind in the case of white women with
young
children would have proved futile in theface of the large number of
empty cells in these groups.
23This statementhas to be qualified since the resultspresented in
Table 4 are not standardized for thenumber of children older than six.
24i owe thispoint to Robert E. Hall. Note that the effect ofthe
misspecifjcatjon of the wage wariable on theestimated effect of any
variableon the housewife's price of time is indeterminate.This effect
is measured as the ratio of theprobit coeffic±ents of that variable
and the coefficient of thewage variable. The effect of the
misspecificatjon in this case therefore dependson the direction and
magnitude of the bias in both probit coefficients.
For example, though
the education coefficient is biased(in absolute terms) upward, the
effect of education on the woman'sprice of time remains unchanged when
E is replaced by.
25
Let the 'true" function be
= + 11-1W+62S >o2<
where S denotes education. Thereplacement of by E
o =C0+C1E+C2S




Plim(C2) = + .
If,as was claimed, s > 1 and s <0 pLS pSE
Plim(C1) > and IPlim(C2){ > !2J- 44-
26Aset of data that seems very alluring in this context is the
National Longitudinal Survey: Survey of Work Experience of Females
30-44 (the "Ohio Survey") which contains information on the asking
wage of non-working women.
Analysis of the variance of the observed wage distribution (S) may
yield further insights into the problems discussed above, since it can
be shown that if W and W0 are normally distributed
=a[1 -)2(a2/a2)( + Z)X].
Assuming a, and°WOare constant one canregressS on X(X +Z)to
obtain independent estimates of these parameters.